China Bribery? No, deterrence

It would be a sign of complacency towards the Chinese regime to believe that corruption was the reason for the sudden disappearance of the entire staff of the strategic missile force, the Rocket Force. The glitter of Xi Jinping's inauguration of his successors forces us to look beyond corruption to find an explanation for these sanctions. It could be that the command of the Rocket Force was careless in its approach to international politics, or that ill-considered technology transfers gave the DPRK strategic forces after just a few short years. These forces have enabled the DPRK to raise tensions throughout the region and destabilize it, something Beijing deplores. A series of errors that Xi Jinping has just punished.

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Li Yuchao (李玉超): leader of the Rocket Force
Liu Guangbin (刘光斌): Li Yuchao's deputy
PLARF: People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Wang Houbin (王厚斌): former deputy navy commander, new Rocket Force commander
Xu Xisheng: new political commissioner
Zhang Zhenzhong (张振中): political commissar
FACTS

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On July 28, 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that the command of the Missile Force, the Rocket Force - its chief, Li Yuchao* , his deputy Liu Guangbin* and political commissar Zhang Zhenzhong* - was under investigation by the Discipline Inspection Commission, the anti-corruption arm of the Central Military Commission. According to the South China Morning Post, these "high-ranking officers were taken to1 ". It had already been several weeks since Li Yuchao had appeared at any official events."
 
On August 1er , their successors took up their posts: Wang Houbin, formerly deputy navy commander, new commander, and Xu Xisheng, new political commissar. They had never served in the PLARF* . Xi Jinping was present at the ceremony announcing their appointment, at the same time as they were presented with the certificate of promotion to the rank of general (the highest military rank in China).
 
 
CHALLENGES

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A reordering of relations between China and North Korea (DPRK* ), considered too aggressive towards its neighbors and partly responsible for the triple rapprochement between the USA, Japan and South Korea, deplored by China.
 
 

FORWARD-LOOKING COMMENTS

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This unprecedented upheaval of an entire command under the direct authority of the President took international observers by surprise. How to explain it?

• Immediately after the announcement, Chinese military sources were unanimous in stating that they had been accused of corruption, but without specifying what this was. Only the Letter from Question Chine, which did not give its sources, wrote: "In return for bribes, they allegedly leaked confidential information to industrial contractors interested in the industry's major investments in launcher modernization and the construction of new silos."
• A careful reading of the many articles and press releases that accompanied the announcement of this singular event does not allow us to go any further. The only information that can be found is counter-intuitive: ten days after the scandal was announced, the Chinese media were purged and Li Yuchao disappeared. Some have compared this disgrace with the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, two days earlier, but no obvious conclusions can be drawn, since the latter is not the subject of any accusations, and, above all, remains present in the Chinese media.
• In any case, these accusations of corruption are hardly credible. Missiles and nuclear warheads are supplies for which there is no competition, so it's hard to see how an entire staff could engage in corruption. Moreover, as the falsely naive Radio Free Asia observes: "The high-ranking generals [of the Rocket Force] had a good reputation before their promotion. So they would have had to have become immoral after moving to the Beijing headquarters, and thus been able to get close to defense-related companies."

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It's hard to believe, therefore, that the whole ceremony was ordered to denounce any possible wrongdoing. The protocol that accompanied the inauguration of the new officers in charge of China's deterrent forces, and its positive character underlined by the presence of Xi Jinping, gave the event a completely different tone. Rather, it was an affirmation of the President's authority over deterrence, its use in the broadest sense and its relationship with international policy. Is the explanation for this powerful sweep not to be found at this level, in the politico-diplomatic mistakes of the nuclear high command?

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But which country might be involved?

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• The United States do not seem to be at the forefront, as China's policy of openness towards them remains unchanged, as witnessed by the warm welcome extended to visiting ministerial officials. What remains is the sanction of indiscretions. One explanation was put forward by senior American officials who were surprised to have detailed knowledge of the structure of the Rocket Force. This was the trail of secret disclosures, and would be the trigger for sanctions2 .
• More likely, it would be North Korea that would be concerned, after it benefited from decisive technology transfers that ensured the rapid development of its deterrent forces.

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The DPRK can boast spectacular progress on missiles. In the space of a few short years, if not months, DPRK engineers have mastered the daunting task of developing solid propellants (doped with nitroglycerine) using very limited resources. It took years and some spectacular failures for the USA to achieve this. Proof of the DPRK's success came in July with the firing of a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile: a decisive operational advance.
 
North Korea alone could not have achieved this. This breakthrough was only possible thanks to transfers from friendly countries.

• According to the American press, which is always happy to indict the Kremlin, Russia was responsible. We can't rule it out, but here, another hypothesis is put forward.
• They would have been Chinese and would have gone beyond what could be accepted by the powers that be. Limits that may not only have been crossed with the approval of Rocket Force commanders, but also in discussions between specialists who understand each other. When those who know are happy to entrust their counterparts with know-how that only they can appreciate.

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With this support, Kim Jong-un has been able to rely on missile families whose tests have been programmed so that they can be interpreted as operational warning shots.
 
At the same time, we can imagine that the Nuclear Weapons Institute was able to obtain the Hwasan-31 universal thermonuclear warhead after receiving information on the architecture of miniaturized warheads and the sizing of their main components. These technology transfers were conditional on the renunciation of the need for a seventh nuclear test.

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North Korea's standard Hwasan-31 thermonuclear warhead
The presentation of the warhead that will equip all of the DPRK's missiles - its diameter of less than 500 mm makes it possible - once again allowed Kim Jong-un to parade and threaten3 .
 
And therein lies the rub. North Korea has found itself in a position to be aggressive and to raise tensions, not only on the peninsula, but throughout the region. These displays are partly responsible for the growing tensions around the Sea of Japan, and the spectacular rapprochement between the USA, Japan and South Korea, deplored by Beijing.
 
This whole sequence would have been sanctioned.
 

• China names General Wang Houbin as new PLA Rocket Force chief after former commanders snared in corruption scandal ; SCMP ;07/31/2008
• Absolute loyalty': Xi Jinping turns anti-corruption focus to China's military ; Financial Times ; 03/08/2023
  North Korea has disclosed various tactical nuclear warheads, including the Hwasan-31 type, Yonhap, 03/28/2023
• Also in this issue: "Chine: l'été 2023 à Pékin", by Rémi Perelman, Asie21 Perelman

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Edouard Valensi

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