Europe, France's enemy
Translated from L'aventure nucléaire française : les ergots du coq, L'Harmattan publisher
For the advocates of European integration, the common edifice cannot accommodate dominant nations: European integration implies equal rights for all states. As a result, no sooner had the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, "the first foundation of a wider and deeper community", been signed on was signed on April 18, 1951, when European leaders turned their attention to France's nuclear ambitions, which they considered unwelcome and inappropriate because they singled out one of the seven. European leaders, imaginative in their obstruction, first tried to halt the French nuclear program, then, after General de Gaulle came to power, stepped up their maneuvers to see French weapons buried in the American quilt.
The following paragraphs give an account of this singular animosity and the stubborn attitude of European institutions and countries to thwart France's defense effort.
The beginnings
The French nuclear program originated in 1944 with General de Gaulle's secret meeting with three French physicists, Pierre Auger, Bertrand Goldschmidt and Jules Guéron. They revealed to him the purpose of the Manhattan program in which they were involved. It's only a three-minute interview of patriotic conspirators, but it gives the general a good idea of the dimensions of the atomic fact. "Thank you, Professor," he blurts out to Bertrand Goldschmidt, "I've understood exactly what you're talking about.
De Gaulle was well aware of the extraordinary dimension of nuclear energy, and in October 1945, just two months after Hiroshima, he created the Commissariat Français à l'Énergie Atomique (French Atomic Energy Commission): an extraordinary state entity with a scientific team of the highest calibre. It was all the more richly endowed as it was framed by a solid administration embodied, in tandem, by a High Commissioner (the first of whom would be Frédéric Joliot Curie, Nobel Prize winner and Communist resistance fighter) and a General Administrator, Raoul Dautry.
The reasons for the creation of the CEA recognize the prodigious specificity of nuclear energy. "Pressing national and international needs oblige us to take the necessary measures to ensure that France can hold its place in the field of atomic energy research. With the CEA, France has once again become a nuclear player. It has made this clear, and will continue to do so.
The first mission entrusted to the Commissariat was to supply France with uranium. A large deposit was discovered in the Limousin region at the end of 1948, and the long process of obtaining highly enriched uranium began. And the hostile maneuvers of the European Commission.
France must align itself with Germany
Because it sets France apart, European leaders, and even supporters of Europe within the French National Assembly, deplore the French atomic research organization and oppose the military program in the making, since the Federal Republic of Germany has no access to it, and Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are not in a position to follow suit.
Equal rights are a key concept. It was with this in mind that the French negotiators agreed to align themselves with Germany, accepting that French plutonium production would be limited to500 grammes per year, the limit imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War.
The pro-Europeans, led by the Atlanticist federalist Walter Hallstein, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and then first President of the European Commission, were to oppose French ambitions. They were given the opportunity to do so by the discussion of Euratom, the atomic pool that was to relaunch European construction.
At its origin was Jean Monnet, an advocate of an integrated Europe, who saw nuclear energy as a new unifying force. On condition that member countries renounce nuclear weapons and that a common organization, Euratom, be the sole owner of fissile materials, that they be used only for peaceful purposes, and that they be subject to "crack-free" control by European inspectors.
Under the principle of "non-discrimination between member states", France will have to put an end to its military program. Indeed, "the Germans fear that France will use the secrecy necessary for the security of its military program as a pretext to evade the controls and exchanges of information imposed on its partners, while at the same time the latter will indirectly help French military research". France must therefore put its scientific advances at the service of other European countries, and accept that its military atomic projects may be subject to the control of a European High Authority, which would be tantamount to putting a stop to them.
French determination in the face of a hostile Europe
General Pierre Billotte, Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces, expressed his absolute refusal in a "very secret" letter dated January 24 56, addressed to Edgar Faure, President of the French Council, and Antoine Pinay, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this letter, which General de Gaulle himself could have written, if he hadn't inspired it, everything is said about the nuclear issues facing France, in a European and Atlantic context:
"The texts that the members of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe have pledged to support vis-à-vis their respective governments and parliaments provide for the renunciation by the signatory countries of the right to manufacture atomic weapons, and place their entire atomic production under the control of a supranational authority. For an indefinite period, if the project in question were to be adopted, France would tie its hands without any real quid pro quo, renouncing the right to manufacture weapons that would continue to be produced by the USA, Great Britain and the USSR.
From the point of view of national defense,... without even deciding right now whether or not France will manufacture atomic devices, it cannot renounce this option or the freedom to pursue, in the atomic field, studies for military purposes. Otherwise, France would be entirely dependent on its Allies for the supply of atomic devices essential to its defense.
And he concludes by pointing out that NATO is basing the defense of the free world on the ever-expanding use of nuclear forces, "countries which renounce the study and manufacture of these weapons, an essential element of modern warfare, will at the same time have renounced the ability to effectively ensure their defense, and will ultimately have handed over responsibility for it to other powers".
Governments come and go, but French determination never wavers. On June 22, 1956, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces, expressed the same alarms to Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Guy Mollet government: "The French government has so far insisted on preserving its freedom of action with regard to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Such a renunciation, in a world which has not achieved atomic disarmament, would be tantamount for France to renouncing all national defense". And he once again rejects Euratom, which would deprive France of its nuclear freedom: "By entrusting France's 'exclusive supply' of nuclear materials to a Euratom with a peaceful vocation, and by not reserving our freedom of action from the outset of negotiations, we run the risk of finding ourselves bound by a network of international agreements from which we would no longer be able to free ourselves".
It would take two years of palavering before Europe agreed to allow France the right to defend itself as it saw fit. To enable the parallel negotiations on the Common Market to succeed, the Commission resigned itself to a formula that diplomats know the secret of. It is stipulated that control of the supply or use of fissile materials "shall not extend to materials intended for defense requirements which are being specially processed for defense purposes or which, after such processing, are, in accordance with a plan of operations, located or stored in a military establishment".
In the spring of 1958, however, French vigilance was called into question when plans were made to build an isotope separation plant, 45% financed by Germany, 45% by France and 10% by Italy. This insane agreement, in which France was in the minority, jeopardized the very existence of the Strike Force, and was signed by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces. He was the inconsistent, if not the misguided, instigator. As soon as he came to power, de Gaulle put an end to it.
Finally, on February 1,1960, the first French Gerboise bleue explodes in the Saharan desert. The explosion had a power of around 70 kilotons, compared with the 20 kT of the first American bombs. was a complete success.
The years that followed were calmer. It's true that the German Chancellor was Konrad Adenauer, who, particularly attentive to maintaining close ties with France, calmed things down. But European, and more specifically German, rejection took on extreme proportions when he was succeeded in 1963 by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.
Germany on the offensive
The highly secret documents made public by the State Department reveal not so much Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's feelings towards France - oppositions between European partners are natural - but, far more significantly, the care the Chancellor took - far from any European solidarity - to ensure that German refusals could be appreciated by Lyndon B Johnson.
In 1963, hosted at Lyndon B Johnson's Texas ranch, he confided: "The questions of European integration and the Atlantic partnership are among the most difficult problems facing the Western allies. In this respect, President De Gaulle is the Chancellor's greatest concern. The Federal Republic has been pleased with the reconciliation between the German and French peoples. But the relationship established by Chancellor Adenauer and General De Gaulle is almost entirely emotional and sentimental, and lacks a solid political basis. This could not continue.
After this preamble, the Chancellor goes on to describe de Gaulle's policy as rigid. "The main problem with France is that de Gaulle doesn't trust NATO. What's more, he overestimated the effectiveness of its strike force . He wanted France to go its own way", and insisted: "France must have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union instantly".
In 1964, the Chancellor asked the US Ambassador to inform the President of the contents of the secret conversations he had had with General de Gaulle! The ambassador did so, specifying that his telegram should be destroyed after submission to the President, so that de Gaulle would not learn of it. The talks were tough. He made it clear that he did not agree with the concepts developed by General de Gaulle. He made it clear that what was essential for him was his relationship with America.... Without close relations with the United States, Europe has no protection; Germany will never renounce its ties with the United States.
... The private talks he had with General de Gaulle often took a "dramatic" turn. De Gaulle told him: "We can only unite Europe if you adopt a position favorable to France. Erhard replied, "Germany must have an alliance with the United States. However, this is not directed against France. ." ...
On the subject of NATO, the Chancellor was able to grasp the General's real views, when he told him that he saw "on the one hand the United States, and on the other a Europe strong enough to be an equal partner with the United States. An alliance could then be negotiated between the two parties for their mutual protection"
On the subject of nuclear forces, we read: "If Europe absolutely wanted to become independent, would it be realistic to think that America would continue to defend Europe? What would Europe's position be in the meantime? What would its nuclear defences be? Would the Striking Force then be a European force, available for defense? De Gaulle abruptly replied that it would be a French force.
The Chancellor replied that he was relying more on the United States than on France for Germany's nuclear defense.
European maneuvers and posturing
The audience granted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on June 6, 1964 to an extraordinary unofficial delegation of the European Commission's most senior figures deserves special mention. The six countries were represented by.
- the German Walter Hallstein, President of the European Commission. He hates de Gaulle,
- Pierre Chatenet, French, last president of Euratom, whose staunch opposition to the French nuclear program is well known,
- Sicco Mansholt, Dutch, first Commissioner for Agriculture, opponent of the Common Agricultural Policy favored by France,
- Robert Marjolin, French, close to Jean Monnet, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs,
- and three companions: Jean Rey, a Belgian who was appointed Commissioner in 1967, the Italian Lionello Levi Sandri, Vice-President of the Commission, and the Luxembourger Lambert Schaus, Commissioner for Transport
Their approach is the subject of a telegram from Dean Rusk to the State Department. He tells us of their objective: to give Europe nuclear responsibilities, and their bargaining chip: the impeachment of de Gaulle and major economic concessions.
As a preamble, Walter Hallstein declares that Europe wishes to make a reality of the transatlantic partnership, which is the declared objective of American policy.
Jean Rey "frankly raises the problem of de Gaulle: It's wrong to describe de Gaulle as a problem between the United States and France, when in reality it's a quarrel between De Gaulle and the rest of Europe.
Dean Rusk replied: "There is a common denominator in all our difficulties with de Gaulle: it is his insistence that we agree to make him and France the spokesmen for Europe without the consent of the rest of Europe. ... I expressed deep regret that de Gaulle's energy was devoted exclusively to building up France's national prestige. History would have been quite different if France had devoted the same energy to building a united Europe and a truly effective partnership. If this had been done, the prestige of Europe and France would indeed be enormous today. Instead, de Gaulle seems to want to build France's national prestige at the expense of France's friends". (These comments seemed to receive a very sympathetic reception from the commissioners).
Mansholt and Rey asked us to be patient in our negotiations". The same goes for the Kennedy round. To no avail.
Mansholt mentioned nuclear issues, pointing out that some Europeans - not all - would like to have a greater role in the nuclear field. I responded by stressing very strongly the indivisible nature of nuclear defense in the Alliance. Forget the possibility of a supranational, autonomous European nuclear force. And to conclude: "The size of our nuclear forces does not strengthen our independence, but makes us highly interdependent with our allies. . Alas! The High Squad, disappointed in its expectations, leaves without even a promise of a nuclear umbrella sleeve.
Europe under American tutelage
European countries have access to US nuclear weapons, but under a trusteeship regime. The weapons remain under the control of the United States, which has absolute custody of them and ultimately decides on their use. -
The dual-capable aircraft donated by European countries are the only ones capable of delivering the bombs, but they remain simple carriers whose pilots take off according to an established flight plan and have to press the button if given the order. "If this is what it means to take part in thinking about deterrence, it's a bit short-sighted"
Even fewer initiatives are expected for the implementation of tactical missiles, whose employment plans have been drawn up, a priori, by local American commands for approval in Washington. This is shown in the figure taken from the "Joint Pub 3 121 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations" manual.
Appearance forces, totally subordinate, but sufficient for countries that see France's free nuclear forces as a presence that undermines their credibility.
In July 1973, Henry Kissinger was advised to make the point to France that "Our French policy has been repeatedly criticized by our Allies, who felt that the bilateral concessions made to France were to the detriment of the Alliance and perhaps even of the unification of Europe".
Michel Jobert, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, responded, after noting that détente was a balance between the two nuclear powers, and that the sanctuarization of their two territories postponed areas of confrontation elsewhere: "For its voice to be heard and respected, Europe must be strong and determined to defend itself. This is a necessary condition for the overall balance of détente. The Atlantic Alliance, to which we belong and which we hold dear, remains as indispensable to the security of the United States as it is to that of Europe.
Loyalty to the latter is in no way incompatible with Europe's current need to assume responsibility for its own defense, which is becoming more specific by the day, in line with strategic developments, and, for the time being, more and more left to its own devices. It will have to rise above this state of affairs
It will not try to rise again: Georges Pompidou disappears, and with him the spur of European independence.
The resumption of nuclear testing in 1995 will be a final opportunity for the European Commission to demonstrate its malice. Giving an extended interpretation to the Euratom Treaty, to protect populations, the European Commission's legal services are planning to have France condemned on the basis of "Article 34 of the Treaty, which requires a 'prior' opinion from the Commission on the 'additional health protection measures' taken by the State carrying out 'particularly dangerous experiments'. This opinion becomes obligatory when these experiments are likely to affect the territories of other Member States" . We are talking here about the British Pitcairn Islands, some800 kilomètres from Mururoa. A derisory argument which cannot be considered for anything other than what it is: a deliberate attack, since the tests are underground!
The end of the Cold War has removed any military significance from US nuclear weapons in Europe, but nothing has changed. Nuclear weapons are legitimized by the ties generated between the USA and the countries where they are stored. "These remnants of the nuclear Cold War forces are the 'glue' that holds the two sides of the Atlantic together." .
Thanks to American weapons, French nuclear forces remain neutralized: Vade Retro! An American study by the National Resource Defense Council makes this point very clear: "The United States found in France's 1995 offer to extend its nuclear umbrella to European countries, particularly Germany, an additional reason to maintain nuclear weapons. Washington interpreted this as yet another French attempt to undermine American influence in Europe, and emphasized the value of the concept of 'extended deterrence' in interdicting the emergence of new nuclear powers or emerging nuclear alliances."
Europe still refuses to recognize the relevance of France's deterrent force, so much so that at the start of the 2000s, our neighbors considered our offer to visit their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to be indiscreet and inadmissible.
Over the years, French determination has never wavered, regardless of the personalities of successive Presidents of the Republic. France's naval and air deterrent forces are at the very top of their game, on a par with American weapons. And these same presidents have all asserted that France's vital space extends beyond our borders, over all or part of Europe.
Until 2024, they will not have been heard.
What will the future hold as Donald Trump's America pulls away from Europe? Will our partners agree to finally draw closer to France, when it must be understood that, for obvious reasons of credibility but also sovereignty, this is a French force and only the French President can order it to be fired?
Edouard D Valensi
edouard.d.v alensi@gmail.com
