France-USA: DISCREET cooperation
Admittedly, throughout its long history, France's nuclear adventure has relied on American know-how, documents and revealing publications. A flow of knowledge fed by three independent and complementary channels: unclassified open sources, which the American philosophy makes freely accessible, and data of industrial origin to which are added closed information obtained within official frameworks of cooperation.
Admittedly, this support was not decisive - the deterrent force would have come into being in any case - but it was undeniably beneficial. We owe it to the well-understood interest, qualified by the friendship that the United States may have for us, to accurately assess its impact and to show them our gratitude.
The cooperation framework
France was helped, but mainly by information transfers. Purchases of equipment, sub-assemblies and sensor components were modest. France did not agree to pay the price demanded: little or no independence, a price agreed to by Great Britain.
Two pieces of legislation blocked any attempt at extended technology transfers:
the McMahon Act, in its broadest interpretation, which goes so far as to prohibit the transfer of indirect technologies such as advanced computers used to optimize weapons architectures,
international treaties, including the Agreement on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under the Sea,
both interpreted with great imagination.
Congress and the Department of Defense put all the more pressure on the technological floodgates because their experts were convinced that France alone was not capable of making a strategic force a reality. So it's simple: no technology, no proliferation. And if, by any chance, a President or Secretary of State wants to go beyond a trickle of information and show less rigidity, the Secretary of Defense and Congress are there to remind them of strict discipline. Indeed, the majority of congressmen, Republicans and Democrats alike, share the instinctive conviction that France is an uncertain ally, the ugly duckling of NATO infected with communism; a country that must be kept away from secrets
The French are equally cautious. The freedom of use of our forces must not be limited in any way by external commitments. We therefore reject any transfer that might be accompanied by conditions.
Open information transfer
These were invaluable sources of know-how, and extensive sources of savings.
One of the first documents on which the pioneers of military nuclear power were able to draw was "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes", better known as the Smyth Report. A few chapter headings illustrate its importance:
History of the Manhattan Project 1942-1945
The metallurgical program in 1942
the plutonium production problem
General discussion of isotope separation
Uranium isotope separation by gaseous diffusion
Planning work on the atomic bomb
The effects of nuclear weapons" by Samuel Glasstone is a good addition to this report. Staffs and strategists everywhere will find in this book, which is regularly updated, all the data they need to plan the use of nuclear weapons.
These two books are astounding. The first describes the organization and basic know-how required to build a bomb, while the second describes the results of observing a multitude of atmospheric nuclear explosions. This is a unique experience of atomic practitioners, which one would expect to be protected and kept secret.
To these two treasures were added, at least for France, unclassified reports on every possible military subject, produced on credit from the Department of Defense, studies grouped together and distributed by the Defense Technological Information Service. The Centre d'Etude et de Documentation de l'Armement, CEDOCAR, was the recipient of microfiche copies of these reports. They could be consulted by all industrialists working for Defense. It was in this way, in particular, that France was able to discover an extensive, operational documentary base on electromagnetic pulses and their effects on materials and hardening techniques.
In addition to official sources, we must add the continuous flow of articles in the specialized press, reporting on the progress of programs, successes and, more instructively, failures, giving indications of the overall characteristics of systems. Today, thanks to the Internet, open defense documentation is still freely accessible, albeit faster and more conveniently. It has been enriched by technical documentation and promotional pages from defense manufacturers.
In addition to this base, closed information transfers were carried out within the framework of Memoranda of Understanding on the exchange of information.
Strictly measured institutional support
American society is divided on the subject of France: there are sympathizers - President Eisenhower is one of them - but also, at all levels of responsibility, men who are not inspired by France, whom they refuse to trust, when they are not hostile to its societal model. His friends will be discreetly loyal to him.
First supports
We can't list here all the missions and visits to American military bases that enriched French knowledge. We will therefore limit ourselves to a few key exchanges, which are sufficient to understand the nature of the relations maintained at the time.
In 1952, Admiral Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission was in sympathy with France. He warned France that its engineers were on the wrong track when working on a submarine with a natural uranium engine. He was behind the timely abandonment of the Q 224 submarine project. Going a step further, in 1957 he enabled France to acquire the highly enriched uranium for the onshore prototype of the nuclear boiler for future SNLEs.
In February 1958, under the Fourth Republic, a fact-finding mission, Aurore, enabled General Ailleret, Joint Commander of Special Weapons, to gather data on nuclear testing methods. What information was obtained?
- those provided to specialists by a visit to the firing ranges - including an underground explosion site - plus a presentation on the fallout. They can rest assured that there are no changes to be made to the measures planned for the Reggane site, apart from the construction of a heavily reinforced firing range,
- information provided by Edgerton, the manufacturer of the explosion diagnostic equipment, , from which high-speed cameras were purchased.
Two things stand out from this visit:
- unclassified information can be of great value to specialists who know how to interpret it,
- direct relations with manufacturers, for commercial purposes, enable us to obtain information and materials that are inaccessible through official channels.
In the early '60s, the French Air Force was trained in the nuclear professions when its squadrons deployed American tactical weapons. They gained access to NATO procedures for preparing and executing missions. At the same time, collaboration developed between French and American intelligence services, to share knowledge of Soviet orders of battle and define objectives. .
In 1961, France was hoping for American support in developing its strike force. This was the mission of the first Ministerial Delegate for Armaments, General Gaston Lavaud. But President Kennedy personally intervened to ensure that no positive response would be given to French requests for anything to do with nuclear weapons, their delivery systems or nuclear testing. The only outcome of the mission was confirmation that there was nothing more to expect from the United States, and a great deal of bitterness on the French side.
In June 1962, a fact-finding mission was sent to the USA to define a French version of the American KC 135 tanker, without which the Mirage IV could not reach Moscow. The mission was received at the Pentagon, at Boeing in Seattle, at the Strategic Air Command and at the Military Air Transport Service. In August, 12 aircraft were ordered. These were not tankers, but multi-purpose aircraft: tankers capable of carrying 128 passengers and equipped with a palletized cargo system.
The United States in sympathy
On June 15, 1969, when Georges Pompidou had just entered the Elysée Palace, American General Glasser's visit to the Landes test center led to a softening of French attitudes (although nothing was changed in substance), allowing, through a mirror effect based on the principle of reciprocity, access to hitherto closed sources.
A strange form of aid and cooperation will develop, with personal feelings playing a major role. There is always room for interpretation of laws and treaties when they lay down prohibitions. Under-Secretaries for Research and Development, sympathetic to France, put the Secretary of Defense's public positions into perspective.
- Atomic Energy for Military Purposes , http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/SmythReport/index.shtml , Base\Atomic_Energy_for_Military_Purposes.pdf
- http://appleswitcher.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=21705
- L'aventure nucléaire, Charles Ailleret, Grasset éditeur
- L'armée de l'Air et le nucléaire tactique intégré à l'OTAN (1962-1966), http://rha.revues.org/index7191.html , Base\L'armée_de_l'Air_et_le_nucléaire_tactique_intégré_à_l'OTAN.pdf
At the end of 69, the Délégué ministériel pour l'armement, Jean Blancard, was able to formulate a series of requests for assistance relating to :
- The reliability of ballistic systems,
- Star-tracker" navigation equipment,
- atmospheric re-entry materials,
- the possibility of industrial involvement in the development of boosters.
At first, it would be a year before a positive response could be given to the Delegate's request. It was Georges Pompidou's trip to the United States, carefully prepared but not without caution on the American side, that marked the start of official American support.
The form that discreet support for French strategic programs took at the time is doubly instructive: it highlights the reserved, cautious nature of the support, as well as the abrupt limits of American cooperation policies in the nuclear field; and it enables us to appreciate the value of the French teams, recognized by their American counterparts.
Two advances have made these exchanges possible:
- France, for its part, envisaged discussions on the use of forces, on the understanding that they would not imply a change in its position vis-à-vis NATO, and without infringing on its freedom of decision: "President Nixon considered that the political decision to use force was reserved for President Pompidou and him alone. He respected and understood France's decision to preserve its independence.
- On March 10, 1970, Richard Nixon authorized General Goodpaster and General Fourquet to explore practical ways of improving cooperation with French forces. These include tactical nuclear weapons and naval forces, as well as the possibility of coordinating the strike plans of the respective strategic forces
It became possible to discuss hitherto sensitive issues with France. "Early contact between John Foster, [Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering] and Blancard would help persuade the French of our willingness to take on board at least some of their demands."
However, behind the President, the Department of Defense is careful not to go too far. It prohibits the disclosure of sensitive or classified technical information, or information relating to the characteristics of American equipment. Fortunately for France, information remains unclassified in the United States which, in our country, would be classified.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) sets out the scope of American support: "American cooperation with France on missiles is aimed at improving the operability and reliability of existing French systems. American support will be given in response to French requests. It is understood that these requests will not be addressed to teams in charge of developing new-generation systems with significantly improved operational performance (accuracy, range, re-entry vehicle, etc.). At the same time, however, it is recognized that exchanges may justify a rethink of existing system architectures.
It is understood that the French party will describe the overall systems with sufficient precision for the United States to appreciate the context. The specific problems whose solution is sought will be described in terms as precise as possible (writing, plans, data) to enable an understanding of the circumstances in which the problems arise and the nature of their causality."
The agreement is remarkable for the precision of its terms, which set out the limits of American support. In return, the U.S. implicitly demands that the French provide information on their weapons. It is understood that responses to French requests can only result in time and cost savings on programs currently underway: ground-to-ground missiles, which will in any case be deployed by 1980. Future systems are excluded from the agreement. No response will be given to requests concerning guidance and re-entry systems, which would involve American manufacturers and constitute semi-public support for the French program
The spirit in which the agreement is being implemented is reflected in an American comment on the problems encountered by France. They mention specific areas such as propulsion, mechanical assemblies and wiring, but these are only factors. Clearly, they are not satisfied with the reliability revealed by their test program. They seem to believe that the problem lies in assembly, inspection and testing processes, and that studying the adoption of American manufacturing and quality controls could help.
The technical support provided should be seen in the context of France's material support for the continuing negotiations with North Vietnam led by Dr. Henry Kissinger. Michel Debré, Minister of State and Minister of Defense, made a point of mentioning this in his meeting with Henry Kissinger on July 11, 1972. The agreement was secret. The object and content of this cooperation must be considered highly sensitive. Consequently, it is understood that these discussions will be given a high level of classification by both governments, and that access to them will be strictly limited to those whose official functions require them to have access and knowledge of them
Exchanges of information from the USA were fruitful, but limited. In the summer of 1973, when Defense Minister Robert Galley and Ministerial Delegate Jean Blancard, taking advantage of French progress in the political sphere (discussions on the use of weapons), wanted to see American support extended to future multiple-headed missiles, "many solutions are possible, but all will cost an infinite amount of time and money. It would therefore be very valuable for French scientists and technicians to know which paths are the most fruitful for advancing strategic and tactical weapons". . They won't get an answer.
On the other hand, when it came to hardening the ground-to-ground component, the United States was generous with its advice. In conversations with the Délégué Ministériel pour l'Armement, France's attention was drawn to the vulnerability of the Albion Plateau and the need for a warning system. (Perhaps France could agree to use the American warning system!) The system will be studied by the FNS Division; a surveillance radar should be installed on the summit of Mont Ventoux, above the plateau. However, in addition to its cost, such a system would require automatic or semi-automatic launch procedures for the nuclear response, which would be difficult to envisage. As a result, the project has been abandoned.
Nuclear cooperation
This is an area of trade directly impacted by the Mac Mahon Act, and one that is far more sensitive than space technologies. However, when France, an ally, is in possession of atomic weapons, it is important to ensure that it provides appropriate solutions to security problems.
On November 12, 1971, a letter from John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Jean Blancard, Ministerial Delegate, set out the scope of cooperation in the field of nuclear system safety. Initially, discussions will focus on operational safety procedures, and will exclude any information relating to American devices. Each party will be able to set out the principles applied:
"For example, we can describe the succession of critical controls, the segmentation between conventional and nuclear circuits, the locking procedures for nuclear racks, etc. ... . Each of us will be able to describe procedures that would be implemented today, such as message authentication and separate handling of firing keys,
As far as nuclear warheads are concerned, we could discuss the principles governing the design of safe nuclear systems, and the mechanical and electrical components preventing an unauthorized nuclear explosion. We could also exchange information on storage and transport procedures
The British will be kept regularly informed of these exchanges. They are specifically informed that "the information transmitted to the French is not sensitive, Restricted Data".
The exchanges were serious and consistent, and the American side was delighted with the French approach to security issues. The result of the two sessions (each lasting about a week) is that the French have a comprehensive and sophisticated weapons security program. It is remarkably similar to our own, and we can be pleased that their overall approach to nuclear weapons security issues is classic
On January 24, 1973, the United States took stock of the type of information that could be passed on to French experts concerning underground nuclear weapons tests: a sufficient volume of technologies (drilling techniques, instrumentation, data recovery, etc.) were either unclassified or of a low classification level to allow fruitful exchanges with France.
On June 27, 1973, the US President received a report on the development of cooperation in new areas: the effects of nuclear explosions on weapons (the nuclear flash), and nuclear hardening technologies for missiles, warheads and silos. Taking into account the prohibitions of Congress and the reluctance of the Department of Defense, Henry Kissinger told Robert Galley that the United States would confine itself to "advice in the negative". It was up to the French side to take the initiative in asking questions and indicating possible avenues; in return, they would be warned against going down the wrong path.
Michel Debré's extremely cordial conversations with Richard Nixon, Mervin Laird and Henry Kissinger in July 1972 included a request for information on Soviet ABM defenses: their radars and missiles could intercept French warheads aimed at Moscow. Data on anti-missile defenses and on the consequences of nuclear explosions on warheads were transmitted. They cross-check information obtained elsewhere and confirm the models developed by France to reconstruct the interception capabilities of ABM systems.
But this information was only made available after President Nixon had signed "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty" in Moscow on May 26, 1972, at a time when funding for the American ABM program had been slashed. This put the ABM threat into perspective. However, it was deemed sufficiently worrying for Georges Pompidou to give the go-ahead for the development of the M4 "mirvés" multi-head missiles.
French mistrust
The exchanges were real, but Georges Pompidou remained wary. Henry Kissinger had to point out that President Nixon's goodwill was thwarted by laws, the administration and Congress. "Fundamentally, as the President mentioned to Pompidou, we attach the greatest importance to close relations with France. We are ready to discuss with you anything that can make military organizations more effective. That is our position. But we have domestic and international obstacles to contend with." These are fine words, but French demands for missile and missile technology to "mirror" French missiles will not be met. On the substance, the American position has not changed. Georges Pompidou will draw his own conclusions in the autumn.
As a gesture of goodwill, the U.S. Administration looked for ways to circumvent the embargo on strategic computers targeting France. A logical compromise was found: "redefine the concept of 'advanced computer' so that France can acquire the latest computer models while remaining faithful to the spirit of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty". This would provide the CEA with IBM 370/165 and Control Data 6600 computers.
Politically, it's the French ear that's the hard one. There was no response to American reminders. President Pompidou was all the more reluctant as he considered that the nuclear war prevention treaty signed on June 22, 1973 constituted a kind of Soviet-American condominium. The treaty stipulated that the two "Great Ones" would no longer threaten each other or use force against each other; but above all, that they would consult each other in the event of the danger of nuclear war, or if there was a danger that a conflict between two other powers might lead to nuclear war. It's up to each side to maintain order in its own camp.
For the United States, which has still not been able to integrate the existence of independent and credible French strategic forces into its strategic environment, "French behavior is incomprehensible". Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council lamented this in a memo to Henry Kissinger on July 26, 1973
a) You should note that in 1969 our defense policy was reversed. We explicitly rejected the position of our bureaucracy, which made the improvement of bilateral relations, especially military relations, conditional on a more cooperative French attitude towards NATO. We rejected theological debates on multilateralism versus bilateralism, our view being that close bilateral relations with France, measured on their merits alone, were one of the pillars of our European policy..... We reversed the previous policy of opposing France's nuclear deterrent . And, perhaps uniquely, in Iceland, the President was self-critical of our past policies towards France.
b. Our French policy was repeatedly criticized by our Allies, who felt that the bilateral concessions made to France were to the detriment of the Alliance and perhaps even the unification of Europe.
c. There will never be a President more favorable to France's theses and aspirations than the current President. .
There is one final argument to be made to the French representatives, because it marks the limits of the freedom of American Presidents. "We cannot pursue a policy in a vacuum, or worse, in an environment where there is growing antipathy to that policy. The question of bilateral relations with France on sensitive issues is potentially highly controversial and ultimately will require Congressional approval, no matter how sympathetic the Administration may be to it.
Collaboration on sensitive issues was therefore impossible, and was condemned to remain limited and intelligently self-interested. France was not fooled, and in September, President Pompidou and Foreign Minister Michel Jobert drew the necessary conclusions. France refused to commit itself further, particularly when the United States stressed the importance of an anti-missile warning system. (It could only be American, and would give the US access to the heart of the French strategic system.
Intense, trusting relationships
The atmosphere changed with the arrival in power of Valéry Giscard, who did not have the same reservations as Georges Pompidou. At the same time, a new Délégué général à l'armement, Jean Laurens Delpech, was appointed, more a salesman than a technician, with a passion for international relations and an innate sense of human relations.
At the Martinique talks in December 1974, Presidents Gérald Ford and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing agreed to extend exchanges to future systems, in particular the M4, on condition that this missile did not have anti-force capabilities (very high accuracy). Well, that's not an objective for France! Henri Conze is given responsibility for the missile exchange program. His mission will last around six years, a continuity that will enable him to gain the full confidence of his American counterparts at the highest level.
The topics covered include the resistance of electronics to nuclear radiation, protection against the effects of electromagnetic pulses, warhead dispersion concepts, penetration aids and underwater missile firing. The organization of exchanges, which now includes meetings on the territory
is the subject of in-depth negotiations to define the limits of trade. As Helmut Sonnenfeldt explains, "There must be no misunderstanding. While it has the power to help with MRV multiple warheads, it does not have the power to help with MIRV independently guided warheads" .
These negotiations proved fruitful, and a "special relationship" was established. Until 1980, more than fifteen secret meetings were held, sometimes in France, sometimes in the United States, at research centers or strategic bases, where programs were being built. Each meeting could last from three days to a week, with around fifteen participants on each side. As time went by, the highly restrictive rules governing exchanges (negative guidances) became outdated. The M4 missile was the main beneficiary of these increasingly confident exchanges.
Exchanges intensify when reciprocity is present
The United States attaches great importance to reciprocal exchanges. Whenever French participants are able to offer a valuable contribution, within the framework of an MOU, cooperation will flourish.
Even in strategic areas, the United States may be interested in French technologies
in 1959, with French advances in submarine atmosphere regeneration
in July 1973, to reinforce the spirit of cooperation, Robert Galley proposed cooperation in the acoustic field, where France, with Thomson ASM, was in the lead. The answer given by the Secretary of Defense was appreciative: "As far as the proposal in the acoustic field is concerned, I will have to consult the Navy, which is not under my control. It is under the authority of Admiral Rickover, and has an independent government. Ongoing Franco-American cooperation will develop well in this field. It is still ongoing,
industrial processes for three-dimensional weaving of carbon or silica fibers, developed by the Lyon silk manufacturers led by Jean Brochier,
in the early 80s, Matra's Durandal anti-slope bombs, adopted by the Air Force, and then, in November 1985, the acquisition by the U.S. Army of the RITA communications system, a major transfer which was long reported in the French press.
However, this is not the main trade flow. It originates from the CFM56 high bypass ratio turbojet engine, a 50/50 joint venture between General Electric and SNECMA. The adoption of this engine to power US tanker aircraft meant that the balance of military trade was in France's favor. The deal was brokered by Georges Pompidou, who was already at his worst, and Richard Nixon, when they met in Reykjavík.
The limits set by France
There should be no misunderstandings about these links: while the USA can appreciate the progress or lag of French teams and the expected performance of future systems, this has no operational consequences. On the other hand, cooperation proves fruitful, as the advice of highly advanced teams helps to avoid major errors, and reveals avenues that French engineers will be able to turn into solutions.
A delicate balance had to be maintained: the Department of Defense had to be convinced of the credibility of France's strategic forces, but could not be told about the principles governing the use of nuclear forces. Thus, the French side's concern for independence has constantly imposed caution, a political mirror image of American reservations
The French Ministry of Defense issued a press release on May 28, 1989, outlining the terms of Franco-American cooperation in the strategic field
"exchanges of technical information in the nuclear field take place between France and the United States, for the benefit of both parties, mainly in the fields of safety and security. Exchanges in these fields were the subject of an agreement between the two countries in 1961. This agreement was amended by a new agreement in 1985.
- The existence of these agreements is no secret. Although some of the work carried out under these agreements is classified, no concepts or formulas have been transferred.
France is building an independent nuclear deterrent with its own resources. Exchanges of technical information with the United States do not make France's nuclear forces, in any of their components, dependent on foreign technologies. A fortiori, they have no impact on the independence of French decision-making on the use of these forces, which depends exclusively on the President of the Republic.
The balance sheet
There is no doubt that the United States accompanied France on its strategic adventure.
Invaluable support
American support of every kind and shape has been invaluable, but never decisive. To put it another way, they can be seen as the lessons of a master to his pupil, or the ultimately benevolent advice of an uncle to a distant nephew.
France was also quick to thank the United States. On July 26, 1973, Jean Blancard unreservedly acknowledged: "We have developed a relationship of trust. We asked a lot of questions and received information that was very useful. Not only did you tell us that business was going well, but also that we were on the right track." :
In 1974, it was reported that France had received valuable advice on the hardening of the M20 missile's thermonuclear warheads. "Our observations and information enabled them to arrive at a much better design much more quickly than would otherwise have been necessary. Thus, we were told in September 1974 that, on the re-entry vehicles, we had saved them two years and sixty kilos, which corresponds to an equivalent gain in payload or a gain of about 200 miles in range. ... ...
The Délégué Ministériel pour l'Armement, Mr. Delpech, told us in September and again in November that this program had been extremely beneficial for France and that he was very grateful. In November, as a token of his gratitude, he offered to provide us with all the results of the nuclear tests in the Pacific, without asking for anything in return
Henri Conze explains the contribution made by the USA to the M4 missile. The missile's program sheet gave three values for each of its essential characteristics: number of warheads, range, hardening, accuracy, etc.: a minimum target that was already assured, a medium target that could be achieved without undue risk, and "an ambitious target, corresponding to what we thought we knew about the most modern American and Russian systems, and requiring significant risk-taking and a real technological leap in relation to our knowledge and achievements at the time"
The sheet had been written before the exchanges began, and the M4 is a totally French system developed without major incident. However, "'the American contribution proved to be very important: it translated into much greater confidence in ourselves, encouraging us not to choose the easy way out or conservatism; this self-confidence very quickly turned into great confidence in our ability to achieve all the ambitious objectives that had initially been set; in the course of the exchanges we were able to verify that nothing shocked or worried them in the goals we were pursuing."
In the final analysis, it's hard to put a figure on the benefits of American support. Henri Gonze, who for years was at the heart of these exchanges, estimates that they enabled us to save significant sums, at least ten billion francs. This is a low estimate, as Henri Conze was particularly interested in the exchanges he was able to follow. To this must be added the contribution of industrial flows and the lessons learned from open documentary collections.
The French teams have taken full advantage of the open information available.
American contributions have been all the more important because French teams have been able to make the most of them. The development of guidance systems was far from the only example of their ability to grasp the situation.
Pierre Usunier, Director of Aerospatiale's Ballistic and Space Systems Division, reveals that it's more a question of know-how seized on the fly, rather than knowledge transfer. American missiles have been an important experience for us, in an indirect rather than a direct way. Reading American magazines provided us with negative information about which solutions didn't work.
Some publications are precise enough to provide a lot of information. We have sometimes been able to reconstruct the performance of a missile from a few rough indications and a photograph; rough indications of mass, dimensions, volumes, etc. So there has indeed been a significant contribution from American missiles, but involuntary and indirect for the most part. So there was indeed a significant contribution from American missiles, but it was involuntary and indirect for the most part.
In just a few weeks, the technical and operational characteristics of the future Tomahawk cruise missile were revealed, based on the silhouette published in the US Senate Hearings , in particular the indication that the missile is launched by diving from a torpedo tube, and that its range should be able to reach2.500 miles nautical miles. The very long range of the missile, whose dimensions are strictly defined, requires a cruise flight with minimal specific fuel consumption. This framework is sufficient for the missile to be reconstituted:
- a flight at Mach 0.8 by a missile with poor maneuverability, unable to follow the terrain at low altitude, and therefore highly vulnerable if detected,
- the type of engine: a turbofan microjet, familiar to French missile manufacturers,
- fuel: solid, with very high specific energy, described several years earlier in a technical document found by CEDOCAR.
Jean Charles concludes: "Their radar and infrared signature - far superior to that of a ballistic warhead - whatever progress may be made in reducing them, makes them vulnerable to detection from above (by aircraft or satellites). On the other hand, their low speed, and the correspondingly long duration of their flight over hostile territory, means that they can be dealt with by conventional air defense systems. The success of their mission is only guaranteed if they are launched in such large numbers as to saturate defense systems
Cruise missiles were therefore unlikely to strengthen France's deterrent potential, unless they were built in large numbers. It was therefore not deemed feasible to launch the program. For the United States, the situation was quite different, but we now know that the main quality of a Tomahawk was its very high precision, enabling one-off strikes against high-value military sites, or civilian government sites. Cruise missiles were the tools of a strategy whose ultimate goal was to disrupt the Soviet regime: an objective that France did not take into consideration.
Another example shows that knowledge of a process is all it takes to find the principle behind it: an innovative state-of-the-art "vibrating beam" accelerometer, the size of a one-euro coin, had been shown to Jacques Villain, on duty at DTEn, during a visit to the Singer Kearfott company. On his return to France, he spent two months at the INPI examining Singer Kearfoot's 200 patents, a dozen of which revealed the accelerometer principle. On this basis, a technological research program could be launched.
The professionalism of French teams is recognized
French teams were judged during an in-depth visit the cradle of the Force Nucléaire Stratégique's ballistic systems, the Aérospatiale site at Saint Médard en Jalles, near Bordeaux in July 1971. Even today, this site specializes in the integration of solid-propellant stages, atmospheric re-entry systems, thermal protection and wound and woven structures.
The quality of their work was impressive, as was the calibre of their staff. Our questions were answered freely, with an obvious knowledge of what they were doing. It seems wise to repeat, as stated in NDDM 100, that the French will achieve their objectives with or without American help, but that they will do so sooner and at lower cost with U.S. help. What they are asking of us is relatively small compared to what they have achieved on their own .
Still following this visit, it is stated: "At no time were we asked to help develop the missile system. They had succeeded on their own. Rather, they asked us to give them the benefit of our experience in solving specific, apparently non-catastrophic problems. The questions raised concerned propulsion (bonding and separation), the problem of nitrogen tank corrosion, the vectorial thrust control system, the life of gas-bearing gyroscopes, hydraulic accumulators, missile pyrotechnic safety, simulation techniques for re-entry vehicle hardening programs, etc. ... . In general, it was possible to give substantial answers to the questions asked, without disclosing the contents of our missiles or contravening our principles.
In the nuclear field, in July 1972, Henry Kissinger received a reassuring and laudatory assessment that would facilitate future negotiations: "Our experts were impressed by the competence of the French experts and the quality of the French nuclear safety program."
In the final analysis, the United States did indeed accompany an ally, France, even though their interests did not coincide; they could, however, remain parallel. American engineers and officers found in their French counterparts interlocutors deserving of their consideration. They allowed them to "talk technique", to get out of the confinement to which competition between rival teams and secrecy condemned them. It's a pity that, at the same time, so many Americans found France impossible to understand!
Edouard D Valensi
edouard.d.valensi@gmail.com
