The Fainting Atom of Apartheid
Translated from L'aventure nucléaire française : les ergots du coq, L'Harmattan publisher
We can learn a lot by analyzing South Africa's nuclear program. :
First and foremost, it's a guarantee of survival for a small country of six million white people under siege, a "minimum" but "sufficient" program,
Above all, it's a reference to a program that was dismantled when the questionable regime that gave birth to it came to an end, and the regional threats that justified it vanished.
The atom is for the whites
South Africa, a developed, segregated state threatened by Soviet-backed neighbors and condemned on all sides, saw its Western support disappear in the 1970s. Increasingly isolated, the South African government convinced itself that it would not be rescued in the event of an attack, and that nuclear weapons were the only guarantee of survival for the country and its regime. Admittedly, a rational decision.
South Africa became interested in nuclear power very early on:
naturally, since it has been a uranium producer since 1952,
1957 was the first key date. It saw the signing of an agreement with the United States as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program. It enabled the country to acquire a Safari-1 nuclear reactor and highly enriched fuel.
1970 saw the launch of the first phase of scientific studies on the theme of "nuclear explosives".
the military dimension was retained in 1974, when Soviet penetration of Africa became more insistent,
the program was completed in 1987.
South Africa's nuclear program is exemplary in its modesty: the bomb within the reach of a small country. South Africa's white population was less than six million in the 1980s.
The source of fissile fuel is a "local" enrichment process derived from the German "jet-nozzle" process, a nozzle-based isotope separation process developed by Professor Erwin Becker. The pilot enrichment plant was launched in 1971, and the industrial site reached full capacity in 1977.
The bombs are simple gun-type devices with no neutron generator. The core consists of 55 kilograms of uranium 235, enriched to 90%. The expected power of the bomb is between 10 and 18 kilotons. The first bomb was not assembled until 1982. A total of six bombs will be assembled at a rate of one per year, which is all that is possible given the production capacity for enriched uranium. These are relatively heavy devices, weighing in at one tonne, with a diameter of 65 centimetres and a length of 1.8 metres.
The bombs were to be carried by a British Buccaneer light bomber first flown in 1968.
London and Washington are targeted
The doctrine for the use of South African nuclear weapons was only partially revealed. It had two dimensions: preventive and operational.
The first and most important dimension is preventive. Its aim was to secure the support of the West, i.e. London and Washington, in the event of aggression orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The means deployed: nuclear blackmail in three phases:
- A chronology of South Africa's nuclear program , http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/masiza11.pdf , Base\A_Chronology_of_South_Africa's_Nuclear_Program.pdf
- How South Africa developed "its" nuclear bomb , http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1978/09/SCHISSEL/16853 , Base\Comment_l'Afrique_du_Sud_a_pu_mettre_au_point_sa_bombe.pdf
- South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program , http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/SABuildingBombs.html , Base\South_Africa's_Nuclear_Weapons_Program.pdf
- Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm , Base\Birth_and_Death_of_the_South_African_Nuclear.pdf
- Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Program http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm , Base\Birth_and_Death_of_the_South_African_Nuclear.pdf
- Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Program http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm , Base\Birth_and_Death_of_the_South_African_Nuclear.pdf
Phase 1: Strategic uncertainty: the nuclear deterrent capability is neither recognized nor denied,
Phase 2: if the integrity of South Africa were threatened, for example by Warsaw Pact countries or Cuban forces in Angola, it would be envisaged to ask certain countries such as the USA to secretly recognize its existence,
Phase 3: If partial disclosure of South Africa's capabilities were not sufficient to remove the threat, a public announcement or underground test would be considered to demonstrate South Africa's nuclear capabilities
The operational doctrine has not seen the light of day. There are two reasons for this:
the importance of the feared international reactions in the event of strikes.
the absence of an opponent: Angola will never be a threat to South Africa. In the absence of a credible counterpart, deterrence is impossible.
The military nuclear program can and must be dismantled
The end of apartheid, and the establishment of a multiracial regime, has eliminated the surrounding threats. South Africa's nuclear devices can be disassembled, its military industrial component dispersed or ruined, without the country's security suffering.
But the country goes further. The South African bomb does not belong to the heritage of the African nation; it is the weapon of Apartheid. As the white power disappeared, it ensured that the entire industrial base on which nuclear weapons were built would be dismantled. The decision was taken by Frederik Willem De Klerk in 1990. It accompanied the democratic process that was to put an end to apartheid in 1991. In 1994, following the completion of nuclear site inspections, the IAEA confirmed the denuclearization of South Africa.
A "black power" was not supposed to have nuclear weapons.
Edouard D Valensi
edouard.d.valensi@gmail.com
